MN3226K In the Preface to the 1993 edition of this volume, edited by Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson: European Business Assignment, UOL, UK

In the Preface to the 1993 edition of this volume, edited by Sonia Mazey and Jeremy Richardson, it was suggested that ‘shifts in power are noted and acted upon by interest groups, who act as a type of weather vane for the locus of power in society’. The thrust of this new volume is very similar in that we see a consistent picture of interest groups exhibiting strong adaptive tendencies. The developments since the 1993 volume have been unidirectional confirming that groups, generally being rational actors, understand that it is best to ‘shoot where the ducks are’. Groups, therefore, allocate lobbying resources to those venues which present particular opportunities in the circumstances at the time and have the capacity to shift resources to alternative venues when necessary. Thus, the multi-institutional, multilevel, European Union policy process presents many opportunities for venue shopping by groups and there is plenty of evidence that groups are increasingly adept at exploiting the
particular traits of the EU policy game.

Similarly, groups are seemingly increasingly adept at recognizing that ad hoc coalition building is also increasingly important to successful lobbying. The numbers of groups active in Brussels and Strasburg are now so large that any one interest or set of interests will find it difficult to mobilize sufficient resources on its own to secure a policy ‘win’. Allies must be found and net- works of support must be constructed which span the complex institutional environment in which groups operate.

However, this innovative stance by groups is underpinned by a quite familiar phenomenon, namely the need for policy-makers to consult those interests who might be affected by any proposed policy change. This ‘logic of consultation and negotiation’ is timeless and entirely familiar to group theorists. It is no surprise that the EU now has a fifty-year-old mature interest group system as it would be difficult, if not impossible, to govern without one. The massive mobilization of interests in the EU is not without its problems of course. Familiar questions of transparency, possible elite capture of access, and even of lobbying regulation have arisen within the EU as at the national level. Moreover, the EU seems no better at resolving these difficult issues, which go to the heart of the democratic process, than have the member states. Our hope is that we have managed to at least shed more light on how the EU lobbying system works so that others may be better able to judge if the system
is the bane or basis of democracy.

In preparing this volume, we owe our greatest debt to our contributors. They have all been superbly professional in delivering draft and final chapters on time and to a very high standard. Moreover, they have been unfailingly patient and supportive as we, as Editors, have occasionally been blown of course by the vicissitudes of life. We could not have wished for a more cooperative group of colleagues. We also owe a huge debt to Dominic Byatt, Oxford University Press.

He has been supportive and enthusiastic throughout and has been patient beyond the call of duty as deadline after deadline has been missed.